

**KENA UPANISAD**

ॐ आप्यायन्तु ममाङ्गानि वाक्प्राणश्चक्षुः श्रोत्रमथो  
बलमिन्द्रियाणि च सर्वाणि सर्वं ब्रह्मोपनिषदं माऽहं ब्रह्म  
निराकुर्यां मा मा ब्रह्म निराकारोदनिराकरणमस्त्वनिराकरणं  
मेऽस्तु तदात्मनि निरते य उपनिषत्सु धर्मास्ते मयि सन्तु  
ते मयि सन्तु ।

ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ॥

May my limbs, speech, vital force, eyes, ears, as also strength and all the organs, become well developed. Everything is the Brahman revealed in the Upaniṣads. May I not deny Brahman; may not Brahman deny me. Let there be no spurning (of me by Brahman), let there be no rejection (of Brahman) by me. May all the virtues that are (spoken of) in the Upaniṣads repose in me who am engaged in the pursuit of the Self; may they repose in me.

*Om Peace! Peace! Peace!*

# KENA UPANIṢAD

## PART I

*Introduction:* Since the Upaniṣad commencing with *Keneṣitam* and revealing the supreme Brahman has to be spoken of, the ninth chapter<sup>1</sup> begins. Earlier than this, rites have been exhaustively dealt with, and the (different) meditations on the vital force as the basis of rites, as also the meditations on the (various) *Sāmas*,<sup>2</sup> forming parts of rites, have been spoken of. After that is stated the meditation on the *Gāyatra Sāma*, (thought of as the vital force), which ends with a succession of teachers and pupils and which relates to effects of action. If all these rites and meditations, as enjoined, are properly observed, they become the cause for the purification of the mind of one who is free from desires and longs for emancipation. But in the case of one who cherishes desires and has no enlightenment (i.e. meditation on or knowledge of gods), the rites by themselves, as enjoined in the Vedas and the Smṛtis, become the cause for the attainment of the Southern Path and for return to this world. But through activity prompted by natural impulses that are repugnant to the scriptures, there will be degradation into lower beings ranging from beasts to the motionless ones (trees etc.), in accordance with the Vedic text: “(If one does not perform rites or meditation), then one does

<sup>1</sup> The Kena Upaniṣad forms part of the Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa of the Talavakāra branch of the Sāma-Veda.

<sup>2</sup> A *Sāma* song is divided into parts—five or seven. This *Sāma* as also each of its parts has to be thought of variously. For such meditation see Ch. I and II.

not proceed by either of these Paths (Northern or Southern). They become these little creatures (mosquitoes etc.) that are constantly subject to birth and death following the (divine) order 'Be born and die.' This is the third state" (Ch. V. x. 8); and in accordance with the words of the other Vedic text: "Three kinds of beings<sup>1</sup> followed a course that deviates (from these Northern and Southern Paths)"<sup>2</sup> (Ai. Ā. II. i. 1.4). The longing for the knowledge of the indwelling Self arises only in that desireless man of pure mind who has renounced all transitory, external means and ends by virtue of the emergence of a special kind of tendency (in his mind) created by works done in this life or in previous ones. This fact is being shown in the form of questions and answers by the Vedic text beginning with *Keneṣitam*. In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, too, it is said, "The self-existent Lord destroyed the outgoing senses; therefore one sees the outer things and not the Self within. A rare discriminating man, who desired immortality, turned his eyes away and then saw the indwelling Self" (Ka. II. i. 1) etc. And in the (Muṇḍaka) Upaniṣad of the Atharva-Veda it is said, "Having examined the worlds attainable by work thus: 'The unproduced (everlasting emancipation) is not to be produced by work', the Brāhmaṇa should resort to renunciation. In order to know that fully, he must approach, with sacrificial faggots in hand, a teacher who is versed in the Vedas and is established in Brahman" (Mu. I. ii. 12). In this way alone, does a man of detachment acquire the competence to hear, meditate on, and realise the knowledge of the indwelling Self, and not otherwise. Besides, as a result of this realisation of the indwelling Self as Brahman, there comes the total cessa-

<sup>1</sup> Born from the womb, egg, or earth.

<sup>2</sup> And thereby they tread a path of sorrow.

tion of ignorance which is the seed of bondage and the cause of the emergence of desire and activity, in accordance with the verse: "What sorrow and what delusion can there be for that seer of oneness?" (Īś. 7); and also in accordance with the Vedic texts: "The knower of the Self transcends sorrow" (Ch. VII. 1.3); "When the One that is both cause and effect is seen, the knots of the heart of the (seer) are cut, all (his) doubts are resolved, and all *karma* is consumed" (Mu. II. ii. 8). etc.

*Objection:* May it not be argued that this result can be attained even from knowledge<sup>1</sup> coupled with rites and duties?

*Answer:* No, because in the Vājasaneyaka (Bṛhadāraṇyaka) Upaniṣad that (combination of rites and meditation) has been spoken of as the cause of a different result. Starting with the text, "Let me have a wife" (Bṛ. I. iv. 17), the Vājasaneyaka shows in the text, "This world of man is to be won through the son alone, and by no other rite; the world of the Manes through rites; and the world of the gods through meditation" (Bṛ. I. v. 16), how rites and duties lead to the attainment of the three worlds that are different from the Self. And there (in that Upaniṣad itself), again, the reason for embracing renunciation is adduced thus: "What shall we achieve through children, we to whom the Self we have attained is the goal?" (Bṛ. IV. iv. 22). The explanation of that reason is this: What shall we do with progeny, rites, and meditation combined with rites, which are the means for the attainment of worlds other than that

<sup>1</sup> The word *jñāna* occurs in two senses: (i) Vedāntic knowledge and (ii) knowledge about gods or meditation on them. *Jñāna* in the second sense can be combined with rites and duties, but not Vedāntic *jñāna*.

of the Self, and are the causes for the attainment of the three worlds of men, Manes, and gods? Nor are the three worlds—transitory and attainable by means as they are—desirable to us, to whom is desirable the world that is natural, “birthless, undecaying, immortal, fearless” (Bṛ. IV. iv. 25), that “neither increases nor decreases through work” (Bṛ. IV. iv. 23), and is eternal. And being eternal, it is not to be secured by any means other than the cessation of ignorance. Hence the only duty is to renounce all desires after the realisation of the unity of the indwelling Self and Brahman. Besides, the knowledge of the identity of the indwelling Self and Brahman militates against its co-existence with work. For the realisation of the identity of the Self and Brahman, which eradicates all dual ideas, cannot reasonably co-exist with work which presupposes the ideas of the difference of agent and results; for the object (of knowledge) being the deciding factor, the realisation of Brahman is not determined by human effort.<sup>1</sup>

Therefore this desire to know the indwelling Self, in the case of a man who has renounced all seen and unseen results attainable by external means, is being shown by the Vedic text beginning with *Keneṣitam*. But the object (of the inquiry) being subtle, the presentation in the form of questions and answers of the student and teacher leads to easy comprehension; and it is also shown that the object is not realisable through mere dialectics. Moreover, in accordance with the Vedic text, “This knowledge is not attainable

<sup>1</sup> “An object of injunction is that which has to be achieved by effort consequent on the injunction. Knowledge is not of that kind”—A.G. The object is the determining factor as regards the content of any valid knowledge. Neither injunction nor any accessory has any effect here.

through dialectics" (Ka. I. ii. 9), and the obligation about taking a teacher implied in the Vedic and Smṛti texts, "One who has a teacher knows" (Ch. VI. xiv. 2), "Such knowledge alone as is acquired from a teacher becomes the best"<sup>1</sup> (Ch. IV. ix. 3). "Learn that through obeisance" (G. IV. 34), it can be imagined that someone, having found no refuge in anything other than the indwelling Self, and having a longing for the fearless, eternal, auspicious, and unshakable (Brahman), approached a teacher who is established in Brahman, and asked:

ॐ केनेषितं पतति प्रेषितं मनः

केन प्राणः प्रथमः प्रैति युक्तः ।

केनेषितां वाचमिमां वदन्ति

चक्षुः श्रोत्रं क उ देवो युनक्ति ॥ १ ॥

1. Willed by whom does the directed mind go towards its object? Being directed by whom does the vital force, that precedes all, proceed (towards its duty)? By whom is this speech willed that people utter? Who is the effulgent being who directs the eyes and the ears?

*Kena*, by what agent; being *iṣitam*, willed, directed; *manah*, the mind; *patati*, goes, goes towards its own object—this is the construction. Since the root *iṣ* cannot be taken here to imply either repetition or going,<sup>2</sup> it must be under-

<sup>1</sup> "Leads to the acquisition of the best result."—A.G.

<sup>2</sup> "Since the intention here is not to make the mind an object of the concept of either repeated occurrence or going, and since the desire is for knowing some special director of the mind."—A.G.

stood that the present form of the root is in its sense of desiring. The form in which the suffix *ṭ* is used in the word *iṣitam* is a Vedic licence.<sup>1</sup> *Preṣitam* is a form of the same root, with *pra* prefixed to it, in the sense of directing. If the word *preṣitam* alone were used (without *iṣitam*) there would arise such an inquiry about the particular kind of director and the direction as: "By what particular director? And how is the direction?" But the attribute *iṣitam* being there, both the questions are set at rest, because thereby is ascertained a special meaning, viz "directed (*preṣitam*) through whose mere will?"<sup>2</sup>

*Objection:* If this be the meaning intended, the purpose is served by the expression *willed by* alone, and the expression *directed* need not be used. Moreover, since it is reasonable that an additional word should imply an additional meaning, it is proper to understand some special sense such as: "By what is it directed—by will, act, or speech?"

*Answer:* This cannot be so because of the trend of the question. For the reasonable conclusion derived from the trend (of the question) is that the inquiry is made by a man who has become disgusted with the ephemeral works and their results, such as the assemblage of the body, senses, etc., and seeks to know something other than these, which is unchangeable and eternal. If it were not so, the question would be surely meaningless, since the directorship of the group of body etc. (over the mind) through will, word, and act is a familiar fact.

*Objection:* Even so, the sense of the word *directed* is not certainly brought out.

<sup>1</sup> The correct form should have been "*eṣitam*."—A.G.

<sup>2</sup> "By mere presence that involves no effort."—A.G.

*Answer:* No, since the word *directed* can reasonably convey a special sense, viz that it is the question of a man in doubt. Both the adjectives *iṣitam* (willed) and *preṣitam* (directed), in the sentence *willed by whom the directed mind goes*, are justifiable as implying: "Does the directorship belong to the aggregate of body and senses, which is a well-known fact; or does the directorship through mere will, over the mind etc., belong to some independent entity is different from the aggregate?"

*Objection:* Is it not a well-known fact that the mind is free and goes independently to its own object? How can the question arise with regard to that matter?

The *answer* is this: If the mind were independent in engaging or disengaging itself, then nobody would have contemplated any evil. And yet the mind, though conscious of consequences, wills evil; and, though dissuaded, it does engage in deeds of intensely sorrowful result. Hence the question, *keneṣitam patati* etc., is appropriate.

*Kena*, by whom: *prāṇaḥ*, the vital force; being *yuktaḥ*, engaged, directed; *praiti*, goes, towards its own activity? *Prathamāḥ*, first, should be an adjective of the vital force, for the activities of all the organs are preceded by it. *Imām vācam*, this speech, consisting of words; as ordinary people *vadanti*, utter; *kena iṣitam*, by whom is it willed (during that utterance)? Similarly, *kaḥ u devaḥ*, which effulgent being; *yunakti*, engages, directs towards their respective objects; *cakṣuḥ śrotam*, the eyes and the ears?

To the worthy disciple who had asked thus, the teacher said, "Hear what you have asked for in the question, 'Who is that effulgent being who is the director of the mind and other organs towards their own objects, and how does he direct?'"

श्रोत्रस्य श्रोत्रं मनसो मनो यद्  
 वाचो ह वाचं स उ प्राणस्य प्राणः ।  
 चक्षुषश्चक्षुरतिमुच्य धीराः  
 प्रेत्यास्माल्लोकादमृता भवन्ति ॥ २ ॥

2. Since He is the Ear of the ear, the Mind of the mind, the Speech of speech, the Life of life, and the Eye of the eye, therefore the intelligent men, after giving up (self-identification with the senses) and renouncing this world, become immortal.

*Śrotrasya śrotram*, the Ear of the ear. The *śrotram* is that by which one hears, the instrument for the hearing of sound, the organ of hearing which reveals the words. He about whom you put the question, "Who is the effulgent being who directs the eyes and the ears?" --is the Ear of the ear.

*Objection:* Is it not incongruous to answer, "He is the Ear of the ear", when the reply should have been "So-and-so, with such and such attributes, directs the ears etc."?

*Answer:* This is no fault, because His distinction can not be ascertained otherwise. If the director of the ears etc. can be known as possessed of His own activity, independently of the activities of the ears etc. just as it is in the case of the wielder of sickle etc., then this answer will be incongruous. But as a matter of fact, no director of ears etc., possessed of his own activity, is apprehended here like a mower possessed of a sickle etc. But He can be known, (as existing unmixed with the ear etc.), from the logical neces-

sity that such activities as deliberation, volition, determination, of those very composite things, viz the ear etc., must be meant for some one's benefit. Just as in the case of a house, so also (in this case) there does exist some one, standing outside the conglomeration of ears etc., by whose necessity is impelled the group of ears etc. Thus from the fact that composite things exist for the need of some one else, a director of the ears etc. can be known (i.e. inferred).<sup>1</sup> Hence the reply, "He is the Ear of the ear", is quite appropriate.

*Objection:* What, again, can there be the significance here of the expression, "The Ear of the ear" etc.? For just as a light has no need for another light, so in this context the ear can have no need for another ear.

*Answer:* There is no such fault. The significance here is this: The ear, to wit, is seen to be able to reveal its own object. This ability of the ear to reveal its own object is possible only when the eternal non-composite, all-pervading light of the Self is there, but not otherwise. Hence the expression, "Ear of the ear" etc., is justifiable. To the same effect there are other Vedic texts: "It is through the light of the Self that he sits" (Br. IV. iii. 6), "Through His light all this shines" (Ka. II. ii. 15; Śv. VI. 14; Mu. II. ii. 10), "kindled by which light the sun shines" (Tai. B. III. xii. 9.7), etc. And in the Gītā, "(Know that light to be mine), which is in the sun and which illumines the whole universe"

<sup>1</sup> "Ears etc., are subsidiary to some one different from themselves, for they are composite things, like a house etc.—by this inference the master of the ears etc. can be known. If he, too, should be a part of the combination, then he will be insentient like the house etc. Then we shall have to imagine another master for him, and so also a third for this. Thus to avoid an infinite regress, a Consciousness that is not a part of the combination is apprehended"—A.G.

(XV. 12), and “(As the one sun illumines the whole universe), so does He who resides in the body, O descendant of Bharata, illumine the whole body” (XIII. 33). So also in the Kāṭha Upaniṣad, “the permanent among all that is impermanent, the conscious among all that is conscious” (II. ii. 13). It is a commonly accepted belief that the ears etc. constitute the Self of all, and that these are conscious. This is being refuted here. There does exist something which is known to the intellect of the men of realisation, which dwells in the inmost recesses of all, which is changeless, undecaying, immortal, fearless, and unborn, and which is the Ear etc. of even the ear etc., i.e. the source of their capacity to act. Thus the answer and significance can be justified.

Similarly, *manasaḥ*, of the mind, of the internal organ; (He is) the *manaḥ*, Mind; because the internal organ is not able to perform its own functions— thinking, determination, etc.—unless the radiance of the light of consciousness is there. Therefore He is the Mind of the mind, too. Here the mind and the intellect are jointly mentioned by the word *manaḥ* (mind). *Yad vāco ha vācam*: the word *yad*, used in the sense of because, is connected with all such words as *śrotra* (ear) in this way: because He is the Ear of the ear, because He is the Mind of the mind, and so on. The objective case in *vāco ha vācam* is to be changed into the nominative in consonance with the expression *prāṇasya prāṇaḥ* (the Life of life).

**Objection:** In conformity with *vāco ha vācam*, why should not the conversion be into the objective case thus: *prāṇasya prāṇam*?

**Answer:** No, for it is reasonable to conform to the majority. So in consonance with the two words, (*saḥ* and

*prāṇah*), in *sah u prāṇasya prāṇah* (where they are in the nominative case), the implication of the word *vācam* is *vāk*, for thus is the reasonable conformity with the majority maintained. Moreover, a thing asked about should properly be denoted in the first (nominative) case. He, of whom you ask, and who is the Life of *prāṇa*—of that particular function called life; by Him, indeed, is ensured the capacity of the vital force to discharge its functions of sustaining life, and this is because there can be no sustaining of life by anything that is not presided over by the Self, in accordance with the Vedic texts: “Who, indeed, will inhale, and who will exhale if this Bliss (Brahman) be not there in the supreme Space (within the heart)?” (Tai. II. vii. 1), “Who pushes the *prāṇa* upward and impels the *apāna* inwards” (Ka. II. ii. 3), etc. Here, too, it will be said, “That which man does not smell with *prāṇa* (the organ of smell), but that by which *prāṇa* is impelled, know that to be Brahman” (Ke. 1.9).

*Objection:* Is it not proper to understand *prāṇa* as the sense of smelling (and not life)<sup>1</sup> in a context which deals with the senses—ears etc.?

*Answer:* This is true. But the text considers that by the mention of *prāṇa* (meaning the vital force), the sense of smell is referred to *ipso facto*. The meaning intended in the context is this: That for whose purpose occurs the activity of all the motor and sensory organs is Brahman.

So also He is the *cakṣuṣaḥ cakṣuḥ*, the Eye of the eye; the capacity to perceive colour that the eye, the organ of sight, possesses is merely by virtue of its being presided over by the consciousness of the Self. Hence He is the Eye of

<sup>1</sup> The word *prāṇa* is used in different senses in different contexts. It may mean vital force, exhaling, sense of smell, etc.

the eye. Since a questioner's desire is to know the thing he asks for, the expression, "having known" has to be supplied thus: "Having known Brahman, as the Ear etc. of the ear etc., as indicated before." This (addition) is also necessary, because the result is stated thus, "They become immortal" (Ke. 11.5), and because immortality is attained through realisation. From the fact that a man becomes free after getting realisation, it follows (that he becomes immortal) by giving up, (through the strength of knowledge), the group of organs beginning with the ear; that is to say, since by identifying the Self with the ear etc. a man becomes conditioned by these and takes birth, dies, and transmigrates, therefore having realised, as one's Self, the Brahman that is defined as the "Ear of the ear" etc., and *atimucya*, giving up self-identification with the ear etc. – (he becomes immortal). Those who give up self-identification with the ear etc. are the *dhīrāḥ*, intelligent, because the self-identification with the ear etc. cannot be given up unless one is endowed with uncommon intellect. *Pretya*, desisting; *asmāt lokāt*, from this world of empirical dealings involving ideas of "I and mine" with regard to sons, friends, wives, and relatives; i.e. having renounced all desires; (they) *bhavanti*, become; *amṛtāḥ*, immortal, immune from death. This is in accordance with the Vedic texts: "Not by work, not by progeny, not by wealth, but by renunciation some (rare ones) attained immortality" (Kaivalya Upaniṣad 1.2). "The self-existent Lord destroyed the outgoing senses hence one perceives the external things and not the Self within. A rare, discriminating man, longing for immortality, turned his eyes away and then saw the indwelling Self" (Ka. II. i. 1), "When all desires that cling to one's heart, fall off . . . then one attains Brahman here" (Ka. II. iii. 14), etc. Or renun-

ciation of desires being implied in the expression *atimucya* (giving up) itself, *pretya* means separating from this body, dying.

न तत्र चक्षुर्गच्छति न वाग्गच्छति नो मनः ।

न विद्मो न विजानीमो यथैतदनुशिष्यात् ॥ ३ ॥

3. The eye does not go there, nor speech, nor mind. We do not know (Brahman to be such and such): hence we are not aware of any process of instructing about It.

Since Brahman, as the Ear etc. of the ear etc., is the Self of those organs, therefore, *tatra*, there, to that Brahman; *cakṣuḥ*, the eye; *na gacchati*, does not go; for it is not possible to go to oneself. Similarly *na vāk gacchati*, speech does not go. When a word, as expressed by the organ of speech, reveals its own idea, speech is said to go to its object. But Brahman is the Self of that word, as also of the organ that utters it; therefore speech does not go. Just as fire, which burns and illumines, does not burn or illumine itself, similarly is this so. *No manaḥ*, nor the mind. Though the mind thinks and determines other things, it does not think or determine itself; for of it, too, Brahman is the Self. A thing is cognised only by the mind and the senses. As Brahman is not an object of perception to these, therefore, *na vidmaḥ*, we do not know. "That Brahman is of this kind". Hence *na vijānīmaḥ*, we are not aware of; *yathā*, the process by which; *etat*, this Brahman, *anuśiṣyāt*, should be taught, instructed to a disciple—this is the significance. For a thing that is perceived by the senses can be taught to another through categories denoting class, quality, and action.

Brahman is not possessed of these categories, viz class etc.; hence it is very difficult to convince the disciples about It through instruction. In this way the Upaniṣad shows the necessity of putting forth great effort in the matter of imparting instruction and comprehending its meaning.

The contingency of the total denial of any process of instruction having arisen from the text, "We do not know Brahman, and hence we are not aware of any process of instructing about It", and exception to this is being stated in the next verse. True it is that one cannot impart knowledge about the Highest with the help of such means of valid knowledge as the evidence of the senses; but the knowledge can be produced with the help of traditional authority. Therefore traditional authority<sup>1</sup> is being quoted for the sake of imparting instruction about It:

अन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो अविदितादधि ।

इति शुश्रुम पूर्वेषां ये नस्तद्व्याचक्षिरे ॥ ४ ॥

4. "That (Brahman) is surely different from the known; and again, It is above the unknown"—such was (the utterance) we heard of the ancient (teachers) who explained It to us.

*Anyat eva*, different indeed; is *tat*, that, which is the topic under discussion and which has been spoken of as the Ear etc., of the ear etc., and as beyond their reach. It is, indeed, different from the known. The known is that which

<sup>1</sup> The word used by Śaṅkara is *āgama* which literally means traditional knowledge which has come down through the line of teachers and pupils. By quoting traditional teaching one does not expose oneself to the charge of speaking about something that defies speech.

is very much within the grasp of the act of knowing, that which is the object of the verb, "to know". Inasmuch as everything is known somewhere by somebody, all that is manifested is certainly known. The idea is that, It (Brahman) is different from that. Lest, in that case, It should be unknown, the text says, *atho*, again; *aviditāt*, from the unknown, from what is opposed to the known, from that which consists of the unmanifested ignorance, which is the seed of the manifested. The word *adhi*, used in the sense of "above", means "different" by a figure of speech; for it is well known that anything that exists above another is different from that other. Whatever is known is limited, mortal, and full of misery; and hence it is to be rejected. So when it is said that Brahman is different from the known it amounts to asserting that It is not to be rejected. Similarly, when it is affirmed that It is different from the unknown, it amounts to saying that It is not a thing to be obtained. It is for the sake of getting an effect that somebody acquires something different from himself to serve as a cause. For this reason, too, nothing different from the Self need be acquired to serve any purpose distinct from the knower (Self). Thus the statement, that Brahman is different from the known and the unknown, having amounted to Brahman being denied as an object to be acquired or rejected, the desire of the disciple to know Brahman (objectively) comes to an end, for Brahman is non-different from the Self. (Or, according to a different reading—the desire of the disciple to know a Brahman, different from the Self, comes to an end).<sup>1</sup> For nothing other than one's own Self can possibly be different from the known and the unknown. Thus it

<sup>1</sup> The expression concerned is *svātmano'nanyatvāt brahmaniṣayā jijñāsā*, or *svātmano'nyabrahmaviṣayā jijñāsā*.

follows that the meaning of the sentence is that the Self is Brahman. And this also follows from such Vedic texts as; "This Self is Brahman" (Mā. 2; Br. II. v. 19, IV. iv. 5), "that Self which is untouched by sin" (Ch. VIII. ii. 1), "the Brahman that is immediate and direct—the Self that is within all" (Br. III. iv. 1), etc. In this way, the text, "Thus we heard" etc., states how through a succession of preceptors and disciples was derived the purport of the sentence which establishes as Brahman that Self of all which is devoid of distinguishing features, and is the light of pure consciousness. Moreover, Brahman can be known only through such a traditional instruction of preceptors and not through argumentation, nor by study (or exposition), intelligence, great learning, austerity, sacrifices, etc.—*iti*, such (was what); *śuśrūma*, we heard; *pūrveṣāṃ*, of the ancient teachers, i.e. the utterance of those ancient teachers; *ye*, who; *naḥ*, to us; *tat*, that Brahman; *vyācakaṣire*, explained, spoke clearly.

The idea that the Self is Brahman having been established through the sentence, "That is surely different from the known, and, again, that is above the unknown", the hearer has this doubt: "How can the Self be Brahman? For the Self is familiarly known to be that which is entitled to undertake rites and meditation and which, being subject to birth and death, seeks to attain either the gods headed by Brahmā (Creator) or heaven through the performance of rites or meditation. Therefore some adorable being other than that (Self), e.g. Viṣṇu, Īśvara (Śiva), Indra, or Prāṇa (vital force or Hīranyagarbha) may well be Brahman, but not so the Self; for this is opposed to common sense. Just as other logicians say that the Self is different from the Lord, so also the ritualists worship other gods saying,

'Sacrifice to that one', 'Sacrifice to that one'. Therefore it is reasonable that, that should be Brahman which is known and adorable; and the worshipper should be one who is different from this." Having noticed this doubt either from the looks or the words of the disciple, the teacher said, "Don't be in doubt"—

यद्वाचाऽनभ्युदितं येन वागभ्युद्यते ।

तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते ॥ ५ ॥

5. That which is not uttered by speech that by which speech is revealed. know that alone to be Brahman, and not what people worship as an object.

*Yat*, that which, whose essence consists of Consciousness alone. *Vāk* (speech) is the organ which, clinging to the eight localities<sup>1</sup> and being presided over by (the god of) Fire, expresses the letters. The letters, too, as limited in their number and as subject to a certain sequence, in conformity with the meaning intended to be conveyed, are also called *vāk*.<sup>2</sup> Thus also the sound expressible by them, which is the *pada* (*sphoṭa*),<sup>3</sup> is called *vāk*. This is in accordance

<sup>1</sup> Chest, throat, head, root of the tongue, teeth, nose, lips, and palate

<sup>2</sup> The word *gau* (cow), for instance, consists of the letter *g* and *au* which are fixed as regards their sequence so as to be able to express the meaning cow. This is the view of the Mīmāṃsaka school.

<sup>3</sup> This is the view of the Sphoṭavādi grammarians. "*Sphoṭa* is derived from the root *sphuṭ* in the sense of *that which is manifested by letters*, i.e. that which imparts definite knowledge of word (*pada*), sentence, etc. Their idea is that this (*pada*-) *sphoṭa* has to be admitted since a unified idea (conveyed by the word) cannot be contingent on a multiplicity of letters."—A.G.

with the Vedic text: "The letter *a*, indeed, is all speech.<sup>1</sup> And that speech, being manifested as the *sparśa* letters, the *antaḥstha* letters (semi-vowels), and *uṣma* letters (aspirates),<sup>2</sup> becomes many and multifarious" (Ai. Ā. II. iii. 7.13). *Vācā*, by *vāk*, by speech, which has these modifications, viz regulated (metrical, *Rk*) non-regulated (prose, *Yajuh*), musical (*Sāma*), true, and false—by that *vāk* which becomes defined as words and to which the organ of speech is subordinate.<sup>3</sup> (*Yat*, that which) is *anabhyuditam*, not expressed, not uttered; *yena*, that by which, by Brahman, by the light of Consciousness; *vāk*, speech, together with its organs; *abhyudyate*, is uttered, is expressed, that is to say, is engaged. That which has been spoken of here as "the Speech of speech" (Kc. 1. 2), and as "When It speaks, It is called the organ of speech" (Bṛ. I. iv. 7) and "He who controls the organ of speech from within" (Bṛ. III. vii. 17), etc., in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, and about whom the question has been raised thus, "The (power of) speech; that is found in men, is established in sounds. Does any Brāhmaṇa know it?" and the answer has been given by saying, "That by which one speaks in dream is speech"—that eternal power of speech that a speaker has is *vāk* which is in essence the light of Consciousness. And this follows from the Vedic text, "For the speaker's power of speech can never be lost" (Bṛ. IV. iii. 26). *Tat eva*, that indeed, that Self in its true nature; *tvam*, you; *viddhi*, know; as *brahma*,

<sup>1</sup> "That Power of Consciousness is *vāk* which is indicated by *Om*, in which *a* predominates, (*Om* being a combination of *a*, *u*, *m*), and this *Om* is called *sphoṭa*."—A.G.

<sup>2</sup> *Sparśa*—25 consonants from *k* to *m*; *antaḥstha*—*y*, *r*, *l*, *v*; *uṣma*—*ś*, *ṣ*, *s*, *h*.

<sup>3</sup> "The power of speech that human beings have, is established in sounds and letters, for it is expressed by these."

Brahman—(so called) because of its extensivity (or unsurpassability)—that which is all-surpassing and is called *Bhūmā*, great (Ch. VII. xxiii. 1). The significance of the word *eva* is this: Know the Self alone to be the unconditioned Brahman after eradicating all such things as speech because of which adjuncts there occur such empirical expressions, with regard to the transcendental, unconditioned, unsurpassing, and equipoised Brahman, as “It is the Speech of speech”, “the Eye of the eye”, “the Ear of the ear”, “the Mind of mind”, the agent, the enjoyer, the controller, the knower, governor. “Consciousness, Bliss, Brahman” (Bṛ. III. ix. 28.7), etc. *Na idam*, this is not; *brahma*, Brahman; *yat*, which; people *upāsate*, meditate on; as *idam*, this, (as a limited object) possessed of distinctions created by limiting adjuncts—as a non-Self e.g. God etc. Although in the sentence, “know that alone to be Brahman” it has already been stated that the non-Self is not Brahman, still with a view to enunciating an explicit rule (that leaves no scope for option) the idea is repeated in the sentence, “This is not Brahman”; or this may be with a view to excluding the identification of Brahman with what is not Brahman.<sup>1</sup>

यन्मनसा न मनुते येनाहुर्मनो मतम् ।  
तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते ॥ ६ ॥

6. That which man does not comprehend with the mind, that by which, they say, the

<sup>1</sup> In *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy *Niyama-vidhi* pins one down to one thing only when alternatives are possible. Here the possibilities are, thinking of both Brahman and non-Brahman as Brahman. And the rule fixes us to the pursuit of Brahman only. *Parisaiṅkhyā-vidhi* merely excludes something—here the thought of non-Brahman as Brahman. So the text may be interpreted from either point of view.

mind is encompassed, know that to be Brahman and not what people worship as an object.

*Manas* means the internal organ, mind and intellect being taken as one entity. The word *manas*, derived from the root *man* in the sense of that by which one thinks, is common to all organs, since it embraces all objects. In accordance with the Vedic text, "Desire, deliberation, doubt, faith, want of faith, steadiness, unsteadiness, shame, intelligence, and fear—all these are but the mind" (Bṛ. I. v. 3), mind is that which has desire etc. as its functions. *Yat*, that which—the light of Consciousness which illumines the mind; one *na manute*, does not think or determine, by that mind, because It rules the mind by virtue of being the enlightener of the mind. Since the Self, indeed, constitutes the essence of everything, therefore the mind cannot act with regard to its own Self. The mind can think only when it is illumined by the light of Consciousness within. That Brahman, *yenā*, by which—they, the knowers of Brahman, *āhuḥ*, say—*manas*, the mind, together with its modes; *matam*, is thought of, encompassed. Therefore *viddhi*, know, *tat eva*, that very one, the Self of the mind, the internal illuminator; as Brahman. *Na idam*, etc. is to be understood as before.

यच्चक्षुषा न पश्यति येन चक्षूषि पश्यति ।

तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते ॥ ७ ॥

7. That which man does not see with the eyes, that by which man perceives the activities of the eye, know that alone to be Brahman and not what people worship as an object.

*Yat*, that which; *cakṣuṣā*, with the eye, as associated with the functions of the internal organ; *na paśyati*, (man) does not see, does not make an object of perception; *yena*, that by which; man *paśyati*, sees, perceives, encompasses, through the light of Consciousness; *cakṣūṁṣi*, the activities of the eye—diversified in accordance with the modes of the internal organ. *Tat eva*, etc., as before.

यच्छ्रोत्रेण न शृणोति येन श्रोत्रमिदं श्रुतम् ।  
तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते ॥ ८ ॥

8. That which man does not hear with the ear, that by which man knows this ear, know that to be Brahman and not this that people worship as an object.

*Yat śrotreṇa na śṛṇoti*, that which man does not hear with the ear, that is presided over by the deity of the quarters, that is produced from *ākāśa*, and that is connected with the activity of the mind; *yena*, that by which, by the light of Consciousness; *idam śrottram śrutam*, this well-known ear is encompassed; *Tat eva*, etc., as before.

यत्प्राणेन न प्राणिति येन प्राणः प्रणीयते ।  
तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते ॥ ९ ॥

इति केनोपनिषदि प्रथमः खण्डः ॥

9. That which man does not smell with the organ of smell, that by which the organ of smell is impelled, know that to be Brahman and not what people worship as an object.

*Prāṇena*, by the organ of smell, produced from earth, existing in the nostrils, and associated with the activities of the internal organ and the vital force; *yat*, that which; *man na prāṇīti* does not smell, does not comprehend like smell; *yena*, that by which light of the Self; *prāṇaḥ*, the organ of smell--being illumined as an object; *praṇīyate*, is impelled--towards its own object. All the rest, *tat eva* etc., is just like what has gone before.

## PART II

यदि मन्यसे सुवेदेति दहरमेवापि  
नूनं त्वं वेत्थ ब्रह्मणो रूपम् ।  
यदस्य त्वं यदस्य देवेष्वथ नु  
मीमांस्यमेव ते मन्ये विदितम् ॥ १ ॥

1. (Teacher): If you think, "I have known Brahman well enough", then you have known only the very little expression that It has in the human body and the little expression that It has among the gods. Therefore Brahman is still to be deliberated on by you. (Disciple): "I think (Brahman) is known."

Fearing that the disciple, to whom has been brought home the conviction, "You are the Self, which is opposed to the acceptable and the unacceptable, and which is Brahman", may jump to the conclusion, "I know myself well enough that I, indeed, am Brahman", the teacher, with a view to dispelling that notion of the disciple, says, "If you think" etc.

*Objection:* Is not such a firm conviction as, "I know well enough", desirable?

*Answer:* True, a firm conviction is desirable but not such a one as, "I know It well enough." That knowable thing alone that falls within the range of cognition can be known thoroughly, just as an inflammable substance becomes consumable to a fire that burns it, but not so the essence itself of the fire. The well-ascertained purport of

all the Upaniṣads is that the personal Self of each Knower is Brahman. Here, too, the same fact has been established in the form of an answer to questions, in the text beginning with, "That which is the Ear of the ear" etc. (I. 2); and the same has been specifically affirmed in the text, "That which is not uttered by speech" (I. 5). Besides, the positive conclusion of the (traditional) line of knowers of Brahman has been adduced in the text: "That is surely different from the known; and again, It is above the unknown" (I. 4). And the topic will be concluded thus: "It is unknown to those who know well, and known to those who do not know" (II. 3). Hence it is proper to dispel the disciple's notion: "I know well enough." For the knower cannot be known by the knower, just as fire cannot be consumed by the consuming fire; and there is no other knower different from Brahman to whom Brahman can become a separate knowable. A separate knower is denied by the Vedic text: "There is no other knower but this" (Bṛ. III. viii. 11). Therefore the conviction, "I know Brahman well enough", is certainly false. Hence the teacher has justifiably said, "If you think" etc.

*Yadi*, if perchance; *manyase*, you think; *Su veda iti*, "I know Brahman well enough." Although the entity may be inscrutable, yet some one who is possessed of real wisdom and who is free from defects, may at some time comprehend It, whereas some one else may not; hence the teacher says with hesitation, "If you think" etc. And it has been noticed that when it was declared, "The person that is perceived in the eye—this is the Self", so said he (Prajāpati). "This is immortal, fearless—this is Brahman" (Ch. VIII. vii. 4). Virocana, though he was a son of Prajāpati, and a scholar, and a king of the demons, still, owing to his natural

defects, understood, contrary to what was taught, an opposite object, viz the body, to be the Self. Similarly, Indra, the king of the gods, who could not comprehend when instructed once, twice, and thrice, did, at the fourth stage, when his natural defects had been removed, realise the same Brahman that was spoken of at the very initial stage (Ch. VIII. vii-xii). In ordinary life also it is seen that, of the disciples hearing from the same teacher, some one understands accurately, some one inaccurately, some one contrarily, and some one nothing at all. What more need one speak with regard to (the knowledge of) the real nature of the Self which is beyond the senses? In this matter, indeed, all dialecticians, whether they believe in (the) existence or non-existence (of the Self), have got their misconceptions. Therefore though the statement, "Brahman has been realised", has been made with firm conviction, still the teacher's apprehensive remark, "If you think" etc., is quite appropriate in view of the unwarranted comprehensions. *Tvam*, you; *vettha*, know; *nūnam*, certainly; *daharam*<sup>1</sup> *rūpam eva api*, the very little form (i.e. expression); *brahmanah*, of Brahman.

*Objection:* Are there many forms of Brahman, great and small, because of which it is said, "very little form" etc.?

*Answer:* Quite so. Many, indeed, are the aspects of Brahman created by conditions of name and form, but not naturally. From Its own standpoint, forms, together with words, are denied thus: "That which is without sound, touch, form, and destruction; likewise tasteless, everlasting, and odourless" (Ka. I. iii. 15; Nṛ. 9; Muk. II. 72).

<sup>1</sup> A different reading is *dabham*, having the same sense.

*Objection:* Is it not a fact that the very attribute by which a thing is determined is its own nature? Therefore that very distinctive feature by which Brahman is defined must be Its nature. Hence it is argued that since consciousness cannot be an attribute of any one of (the elements) earth etc., nor can it be of all of them in their transformation (as body), and as it is not an attribute of either of (the senses such as) the ear etc., or of the internal organ (mind), therefore it is a feature of Brahman; and thus is Brahman defined by consciousness. Thus it has been said, "Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman" (Br. III. ix. 28.7) "Pure intelligence only" (Br. II. iv. 12), "Brahman is Truth, Knowledge, Infinite" (Tai. II. i. 1), "Brahman is consciousness" (Ai. V. 3) —thus, too, is the feature of Brahman determined in the Vedic texts.

*Answer:* Truly this is so. But even so, that aspect is indicated, not from the intrinsic point of view, but merely with reference to the limiting adjuncts --mind, body, and senses; and this is because of Its correspondence with those things, in accordance as the body etc. undergo expansion, contraction, disruption, etc., or are destroyed. But in reality, the conclusion will be: "unknown to those who know well, and known to those who do not know" (Ke. II. 3).

The expression, *yat asya*, should be construed with the expression, *brahmaṇaḥ rūpam* (the aspect of Brahman), that preceded it, (meaning thereby: that form of Brahman which). Not only do you know little of the expression of that Brahman that is conditioned by the human personality, but the expression of Brahman as conditioned by divine adjuncts, which you *deveṣu vettha*, know among the gods, that too, as known to you, is very little indeed. This is how I think. Whether the expression be in the human

personality or whether it be among the gods, it does not become freed from insignificance, since it is conditioned by adjuncts. The purport is that the Brahman, that is free from all distinctions, that is one without a second, and that known as Bhūmā (great) and eternal, cannot be known as a fully comprehended object. Since this is so, *atha nu*, therefore; *manye*, I think; *te*, for you; even now, Brahman is *mīmāṃsyaṃ eva*, certainly to be deliberated on. The disciple having been told so by the teacher, sat in solitude with his mind concentrated, discussed the traditional teaching, as imparted by the teacher, together with its purport, ascertained it by a process of reasoning, made it a matter of personal experience, approached the teacher, and said, “*Manye*, (now) I think: (Brahman) is *viditam*, known.”

(Teacher): “How (is Brahman known to you)?”

(Disciple): “Listen!” –

नाह मन्ये मुवेदेति नो न वेदेति वेद च ।

यो नस्तद्वेद तद्वेद नो न वेदेति वेद च ॥ २ ॥

2. “I do not think, ‘I know (Brahman) well enough’: (i.e. I consider) ‘Not that I do not know: I know and I do not know as well.’ He among us who understands that utterance, ‘Not that I do not know: I know and I do not know as well’, knows that (Brahman).”

*Na aham n. mye suveda iti*, I do not think, “I know Brahman well enough.” Being told (by the teacher), “Then Brahman is not certainly known by you”, (the disciple) replies, “*No na veda iti, veda ca*, not that I do not know Brahman: and I know, too.” From the use of the word *ca*

(and), in the expression *veda ca*, we are to understand, “*Na veda ca*, and I do not know, as well.”

(Teacher): Is it not contradictory (to say), “I do not think, ‘I know (Brahman) well enough,’ ” and “Not that I do not know: I know and I do not know as well”? If you do not consider, “I know well enough”, then how can you consider, “I know too”? Again if you consider, “I do know”, then why do you not consider, “I know well enough”? Leaving out of consideration doubt and false knowledge, it is a contradiction to say that the very same thing which is known by a man is not known well enough by him. Nor can a restrictive rule be laid down to the effect that Brahman is to be known as an object of doubt or false knowledge. For doubt and false knowledge are, indeed, everywhere known to be the causes of harm.

Though the disciple was thus given a shaking by the teacher, he remained unmoved. Moreover, revealing his own firm conviction in the knowledge of Brahman, he boldly declared with the strength derived from the traditional knowledge as imparted by the teacher in the sentence, “It is different from the known and is also above the unknown”, as also from the strength derived from reasoning and (personal) realisation. How (did he declare)? That is being said: “*Yah*, anyone who; *nah*, among us, among my co-disciples; *veda*, knows in reality; *tat*, that, that sentence uttered by me; he *veda*, knows; *tat*, Brahman.” (Teacher): “What again is your assertion?” To this he answers: “*No na veda iti veda ca*, not that I do not know: I know and I do not know as well.” With a view to showing his concurrence with the idea of the teacher and counteracting the comprehension of people of dull intellect, the disciple repeated with conviction in another language, viz “Not that I do not

know: I know and I do not know as well”, the very same thing which was presented in the sentence, “It is different from the known and it is above the unknown”; and in doing so, he associated with this his own inference and realisation. Thus the exclamation, “He among us who understands that utterance knows that Brahman”, becomes justifiable.

Stepping aside from the dialogue between the teacher and the taught, the Upaniṣad, speaking for itself, presents in these words, *yasyāmatam* etc., the whole of the conclusion arrived at through the dialogue:

यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः ।

अविज्ञातं विजानतां विज्ञातमविजानताम् ॥ ३ ॥

3. It is known to him to whom It is unknown; he does not know to whom It is known. It is unknown to those who know well, and known to those who do not know.

To that knower of Brahman, *yasya*, to whom; *amatam*, unknown; whose view, conviction, is that Brahman is not known; *tasya*, to him; *matam*, is known, Brahman is fully known—that is the meaning. Again, *yasya*, he to whom; *matam*, known; he who has the conviction, “Brahman is known to me”; *sah*, he; *na veda*, does not know; to be sure. The two views of the man of knowledge and the man of ignorance, which are thus presented, are being distinctly affirmed (in the second line), *avijñātam vijñānatām* etc. *Avijñātam*, not known; Brahman is in fact unknown to *vijñānatām*, to the people who know—that is to say, to those who have fully realised. Brahman, is *vijñātam*, known;

*avijānatam*, to those who do not know, to those who have not got full realisation—that is to say, to those who identify the Self merely with the senses, the mind, and the intellect, but not to those whose intelligence is extremely primitive, (these latter being left out of consideration), for the latter do not have the consciousness, “Brahman is known by us”. The error involved in the idea, “Brahman is known to us”, is possible for those, however, who, by reason of non-discrimination between Brahman and the limiting adjuncts and because of their familiarity with the limiting adjuncts such as the intellect, consider the senses, the mind, and the intellect as the Self. Hence the incomplete knowledge is presented as a view to be refuted in the text, “known to those who do not know”. Or the latter half (of the verse, viz) *avijñātam* etc., is adduced as a reason (for the first half).<sup>1</sup>

It has been ascertained that Brahman is unknown to those who know. If Brahman be wholly unknown, then there remains no distinction between the ordinary people and the knowers of Brahman. Besides, the statement, “unknown to those who know”, is self-contradictory. How then can Brahman be known adequately? To explain this the Upaniṣad says:

प्रतिबोधविदितं मतममृतत्वं हि विन्दते ।  
आत्मना विन्दते वीर्यं विद्यया विन्दतेऽमृतम् ॥ ४ ॥

<sup>1</sup> “Just as in common experience it is well known that to the people, aware of the nature of the mother of pearl, the silver superimposed on it remains unknown (on that mother of pearl) but to the ignorant alone the superimposed silver is known (as silver), similarly, knowableness being a thing superimposed on Brahman, the men of realisation do not consider that Brahman as known.”—A.G.

4. It (i.e. Brahman) is really known when It is known with (i.e. as the Self of) each state of consciousness, because thereby one gets immortality. (Since) through one's own Self is acquired strength, (therefore) through knowledge is attained immortality.

*Pratibodha-viditam*, known with reference to each state of intelligence. By the word *bōdha* are meant the cognitions acquired through the intellect. The Self, that encompasses all ideas as Its objects, is known in relation to all these ideas. Being the witness of all cognitions, and by nature nothing but the power of consciousness, the Self is indicated by the cognitions themselves, in the midst of cognitions, as non-different from them. There is no other door to Its awareness. Therefore when Brahman is known as the innermost Self (i.e. witness) of cognitions, then is It *matam*, known, that is to say, then there is Its complete realisation. Only by accepting Brahman as the witness of all cognitions can it be established that It is by nature a witness that is not subject to growth and decay, and is eternal, pure in essence, the Self, unconditioned, and one in all beings,<sup>1</sup> just as it is in the case of *ākāśa* (space) because of the non-difference of its characteristics despite its existence in pots, caves, etc. The purport of that very traditional text, "It is different from the known, and again It is above the unknown" (Ke. I. 4) which is thus clarified, is concluded here.

<sup>1</sup> "Since the reality of my consciousness, by virtue of which I am the witness, exists equally in all, I am not a mere witness in a single body. And since difference, origination, etc. do not inhere in the witness, therefore the non-duality, eternality, etc. of the witness are also established."—A.G.

For (in support of this) there is the other Vedic text: “The Witness of vision, the Hearer of hearing, the Thinker of thought, the Knower of knowledge” (Br. III. IV. 2).

On the other hand, the explanation may run like this: “The Self being the agent of the act of knowing, one infers It to be the agent of the action from the fact of the cognitive act itself, just as one knows that to be the wind which moves a tree”; if this be the explanation, then the Self is a substance possessed of the power of knowing, but It is not the knowledge itself; and as for knowledge, it originates and dies; when knowledge originates, the Self becomes modified by it; and when knowledge dies, the Self becomes nothing but an unmodified substance with Its intelligence destroyed. In such a case, one cannot avoid the objection that the Self (thereby) becomes changeable, composed of parts, non-eternal, impure, etc.

As for the (following) view of the school of Kaṇāda, “Knowledge, arising from the contact of the soul and the mind, inheres in the soul; hence is the soul endowed with knowership. But it is not changeable; it is merely a substance just like a pot in which colour inheres” –since according to this view, too, Brahman is a mere substance without consciousness, it contradicts such Vedic texts as, “Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman” (Br. III. ix. 28.7), “Brahman is Consciousness” (Ai. V. 3). And as the soul is partless and hence has no locality in it, and as the mind is ever in contact with it, the consequent illogicality of admitting any law regarding the origination of memory becomes insurmountable. Besides, one has to imagine that the Self can have the attribute of coming in contact with others, which idea is repugnant to the Vedas and the Smṛtis; for such are the Vedic and Smṛti texts: “Unattached, for It is never at-

tached" (Br. III. ix. 26), "It is unconnected, and is the supporter of all" (G. XIII. 14). Moreover, since logic demands that a thing that has attributes, and is not of a different category, can come into contact with another having attributes, therefore it is illogical to hold that the Self which is attributeless, undifferentiated, and distinct from everything else, can come into contact with anything whatsoever that does not belong to the same category. Hence if the Self is the witness of all cognitions, then and not otherwise is established the idea that the Self, which is an effulgence that is in reality eternal and undecaying knowledge, is Brahman. Therefore the expression *pratibodha-viditam* has the meaning as explained by us.

As for the explanation, "The expression, *pratibodha-viditam* means that the Self is known to oneself", it is possible in a context where the Self appears as a conditioned thing through identification with the limiting adjunct, intellect, so as to have such apparent activities as knowing the Self by the self (referred to in the texts): "Sees the Self in his own self" (Br. IV. iv. 23), "O Puruṣottama, (lit. Supreme Puruṣa, i.e. Being) you yourself know your Self through the self" (G. X. 15). But in a context where the unconditioned Self is one, there can neither be knowing by oneself nor by another. Besides, It being by nature Consciousness Itself, there can be no dependence on another consciousness, just as a light does not depend on another light.

If the fact of being known to oneself is held in accordance with the Buddhist theory, then knowledge becomes momentary and is left without a Self (Reality); and this will contradict such Vedic texts as: "For the knower's function of knowing can never be lost, because it is immortal" (Br. IV. iii. 30), "Eternal, multiformed, all-pervading" (Mu. I. i.

6), "That great birthless Self is undecaying, immortal, undying, fearless" (Bṛ. IV. iv. 25).

Others, again, imagine that by the word *pratibodha* is meant uncaused knowledge, as in the case of a sleeping man, while according to still others it is the knowledge that flashes but once.<sup>1</sup> (To this we say): Whether it be caused or uncaused, and whether it flashes once or twice, it is *pratibodha* to be sure.

*Hi*, because; *vindate*, (one) attains; *amṛtatvam*, immortality, existence in one's own Self, emancipation -by virtue of the aforesaid *pratibodha*, i.e. from the knowledge of the Self as appearing with reference to (i.e. as the witness of) each state of consciousness, therefore the Self is truly known when It is known along with each state of consciousness. Besides, consciousness, as having the indwelling Self as its content, is alone held to be the cause of immortality. Immortality does not surely consist in the Self becoming a non-Self. Immortality being the very nature of the Self, it is certainly without any cause. And thus mortality consists in the Self being perceived as the non-Self through ignorance.

How, again, is immortality attained through the aforesaid knowledge of the Self? This is being answered. *Ātmanā* through one's own Self; *vindate*, (one) attains; *vīryam*, strength, capacity. The strength got from wealth, friend, incantation, medicine, austerity, or Yoga cannot conquer death, for it is produced by impermanent things. But the strength, consequent on the knowledge of the Self, is

<sup>1</sup> "Once the unchanging Self is realised, there can no more be any knowership and therefore no possibility of further knowledge. Hence the knowledge that flashes but once and becomes the cause of immediate emancipation is called *pratibodha*."—A.G.

acquired through the Self alone and not through anything else. Thus, since the strength resulting from the knowledge of the Self is independent of any means of acquisition, that strength alone is able to conquer death. Since the strength produced by the knowledge of the Self is thus attained through the Self, therefore, *vidyayā*, through knowledge about the Self; (one) *vindate*, attains; *amṛtam*, immortality. In the Upaniṣad of the Atharva-Veda it is said, "This Self is not to be attained by one who has no strength, (resulting from steadfastness in the Self)" (Mu. III. ii. 4). Therefore the statement of the reason, "because thereby one attains immortality", is quite appropriate.

Pitiable, indeed, it is to suffer through ignorance, birth, old age, death, disease, etc., among multitudes of beings such as gods, men, animals, ghosts, etc., in whom there is an abundance of misery natural to transmigratory existence. Therefore,

इह चेदवेदीदथ सत्यमस्ति  
 न चेदिहावेदीन्महती विनष्टिः ।  
 भूतेषु भूतेषु विचित्य धीराः  
 प्रेत्यास्माल्लोकादमृता भवन्ति ॥ ५ ॥  
 इति केनोपनिषदि द्वितीयः खण्डः ॥

5. If one has realised here, then there is truth; if he has not realised here, then there is great destruction. The wise once, having realised (Brahman) in all beings, and having turned away from this world, become immortal.

*Cet*, if—a man having scriptural sanction and ability; *avedit*, has known—the Self as defined and in the manner already explained; *iha*, here, indeed; *atha* then; *asti satyam*, there is truth, there subsist in this human birth the values consisting in long life, wealth, and holiness,<sup>1</sup> or supreme reality. *Iha*, here, even while living, *cet*, if; a competent man *na avedit*, has not realised; then there is *mahatī*, great, interminable; *vinaṣṭiḥ* destruction, transmigratory existence consisting in non-cessation of a continuous succession of birth, old age, death, etc. Therefore the *dhīrāḥ*, wise, Brāhmaṇas (the knowers of Brahman), who are thus familiar with merits and demerits; *vicitya*, having known, realised, the one reality of the Self; *bhūteṣu bhūteṣu*, in all beings moving and unmoving; *pretya*, turning away from, desisting from this world of ignorance—the world consisting of “I and mine”—i.e. having attained the non-dual state consisting in becoming identified with the Self of all; *amṛtāḥ bhavanti*, become immortal, become Brahman indeed—this is the idea; as it has been said in the Vedic text: “He who knows that supreme Brahman becomes Brahman indeed” (Mu. III. ii. 9).

<sup>1</sup> “This is said by way of eulogy. (The idea is that) even worldly reality (or value), comprising long life (*avināśa*), wealth (*arthavattā*), holiness (*sadbhāva*), and fame, comes to the knower of Brahman (as a by-product). In reality, the result consisting in being established in Brahman follows as a necessary consequence.”—A.G.

### PART III

ब्रह्म ह देवेभ्यो विजिग्ये तस्य ह ब्रह्मणो विजये देवा  
अमहीयन्त ॥ १ ॥

1. It was Brahman, indeed, that achieved victory for the sake of the gods. In that victory, that was in fact Brahman's, the gods became elated.

After hearing the text, "unknown to those who know well, and known to those who do not know" etc. (Ke. II. 3), some people of dull intellect may have this kind of delusion: "It is seen that whatever exists is known through the valid means of cognition; and whatever does not exist remains unknown, is like the horns of a hare, and is absolutely non-existent. Similarly, this Brahman, being unknown, is certainly non-existent"; lest there be this delusion, this story is begun. For the subsequent passages are seen to be leading to this conclusion: "Since that very Brahman is the ruler in every way, the supreme Deity of even the deities, the supreme Lord over the lordly beings, inscrutable, the cause of victory of the gods, and the cause of the defeat of the devils, therefore, how can It be non-existent?" Or the story is meant to eulogise the knowledge of Brahman. How? By saying that it was surely by virtue of the knowledge of Brahman, that Fire and other gods attained supremacy over the gods, and Indra got greater pre-eminence still. Or (through the story) it is shown that Brahman is inscrutable, inasmuch as Fire and others, powerful though they are, knew Brahman with sheer difficulty, and so also did Indra,

even though he is the ruler of the gods. Or the whole thing is meant to enjoin an injunction regarding the secret teachings (about meditations) that will follow<sup>1</sup> (Ke. IV. 4-7). Or the story is meant to show that apart from the knowledge of Brahman all notions of agentship etc. that creatures possess, as for instance the conceit of the gods with regard to victory etc., are false.

*Brahman*, the supreme Brahman already spoken of; *ha*, verily; *devebhyaḥ*, for the sake of the gods; *vijigye*, achieved victory. In a fight between the gods and the devils, Brahman, after conquering the devils, the enemies of the world and transgressors of divine rules, gave to the gods the victory and its results for ensuring the stability of the world. *Tasya ha Brahmanāḥ vijaye*, in that victory which was, indeed, Brahman's; *devāḥ* the gods, Fire etc.; *amahīyanta*, became elated.

त ऐक्षन्तास्माकमेवायं विजयोऽस्माकमेवायं महिमेति ।  
तद्वैषां विजज्ञौ तेभ्यो ह प्रादुर्बभूव तन्न व्यजानत किमिदं  
यक्षमिति ॥ २ ॥

2. They thought, "Ours, indeed, is this victory; ours, indeed, is this glory." Brahman knew this pretension of theirs. To them He did

<sup>1</sup> "The realisation of the Self as Brahman, which is meant for the most advanced ones and which is not an object of knowledge, has been spoken of earlier. Later will be stated the meditation on the qualified Brahman which is for the less advanced people. The following passages present that meditation, for the injunction for it is clearly to be seen (in IV. 6-7). So the real significance lies in this. As for the other interpretations (advanced by Śaṅkara), they are merely by way of showing possibilities."—A.G.

appear. They could not make out about that thing,<sup>1</sup> as to what this Yakṣa (venerable Being) might be.

Then not knowing that this victory and this glory belonged to God who sits in the hearts as the indwelling Self—omniscient, dispenser of the fruits of all works of all creatures, omnipotent, and desirous of encompassing the stability of the world—*te*, they, those gods; *aikṣanta*, thought; “*Ayam Vijayaḥ*, this victory, achieved by those who identify themselves with such limited beings as Fire etc.; is *asmākam eva*, ours indeed. *Asmākam eva*, ours indeed, and not of God who is our indwelling Self; is *ayam mahimā*, this glory evidenced by such states as of Fire, Air, Indra, etc., which are experienced by us as the result of victory. This has not been achieved by God who is our indwelling Self.” Brahman *ha*, surely; *vijajñau*, knew; *tat*, that, that deliberation of those whose thoughts were being directed by a false self-conceit; for Brahman is omniscient by virtue of being the director of the senses of all creatures. Noticing this false pride of the gods, and thinking, “In order that the gods may not be thus defeated like the devils, as a consequence of their vain-glory, I shall, out of grace for them, favour the gods by removing their presumptuousness”; *tebhyaḥ*, to the gods, for their sake; *ha*, indeed; through an unprecedentedly wonderful and astonishing form created by Brahman’s own power of *Māyā*;<sup>2</sup> *prādurbabhūva*, appeared as an

<sup>1</sup> Could not solve this riddle about the Brahman, appearing in the form of Yakṣa.

<sup>2</sup> “The *yoga*, or the combination, of attributes—*Sattva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas* is *Māyā*. Through the power of that.”—A.G.

object of perception to the senses of the gods. The gods *na vyajānata*, did not comprehend; *tat*, that, the Brahman, as appearing; *kim iti*, as to what; *idam yakṣam*, this venerable great Being, might be.

तेऽग्निमब्रुवञ्जातवेद एतद्विजानीहि किमिदं यक्षमिति  
तथेति ॥ ३ ॥

3. They said to Fire, "O Jātavedā, find out thoroughly about this thing as to what this Yakṣa is." He said, "So be it."

*Te*, they—those gods who failed to know It, and were desirous of knowing It, but had fear in their hearts; *agnim*, to Fire, (lit.) who goes ahead (of all); and who is *jātavedā*, almost omniscient;<sup>1</sup> *abruvan*, said: O Jātavedā, you being powerful among us *vi jānīhi*, thoroughly find out about; *etat*, this Yakṣa that is in our view; *kim etat yakṣam iti*, as to what this Yakṣa (venerable Being) is.

तदभ्यद्रवत्तमभ्यवदत्कोऽसीत्यग्निर्वा अहमस्मीत्यब्रवी-  
ज्जातवेदा वा अहमस्मीति ॥ ४ ॥

4. To It he went. To him It said, "Who are you?" He said, "I am known as Fire, or I am Jātavedā."

Saying, "*Tathā*, so be it", *iti*, this much; Fire *tat*, towards that Yakṣa; *adrāvat*, approached; Fire moved towards It. *Tam*, to him, to Fire, who had approached

<sup>1</sup> Agni precedes all other deities (*agre gavchati*) in receiving oblations at sacrifices; and Jātavedā is one who knows (*veda*) all that is created (*Jāta*).

and was desirous of asking, but had become silent because of absence of arrogance in Its presence, the Yakṣa, *abhyavadat*, said; “*Kaḥ asi iti*, who are you?” Thus being asked by Brahman, Fire said, “*Agniḥ vai*, I am Fire (*agni*) by name, and am also familiarly known as *Jāta-vedā*”, showing thereby his self-importance consisting in his being well known through the two names.

तस्मिंस्त्वयि किं वीर्यमित्यपीदं सर्वं दहेयं यदिदं  
पृथिव्यामिति ॥ ५ ॥

5. (It said), “What power is there in you, such as you are?” (Fire said), “I can burn up all this that is on the earth.”

To him, who had spoken thus, Brahman said, “*Tasmin tvayi*, in you who are such, who possess such famous names and attributes, *kim vīryam* what power, what ability, is there?” He replied, *daheyam*, I can burn up, reduce to ashes. *idam sarvam*, all this creation that moves and does not move; *prithivyām*, on this earth. The word *prithivyām* is used illustratively (to indicate everything), for even things that are in the region above the earth are surely consumed by fire.

तस्मै तृणं निदधावेतद्दहेति । तदुपप्रेयाय सर्वजवेन तन्न  
शशाकं दग्धुं स तत एव निववृते नैतदशकं विज्ञातुं यदे-  
तच्छक्तिमिति ॥ ६ ॥

6. (Yakṣa) placed a straw for him saying, “Burn this.” (Fire) approached the straw with the power born of full enthusiasm. He could

not consume it. He returned from the Yakṣa (to tell the gods), "I could not ascertain It fully as to what this Yakṣa is."

*Tasmai*, for him, who had such presumption : Brahman *ṛṇam nidadhau*, placed a straw, in front of Fire. Being told by Brahman, "*Etat*, this, mere straw; *daha*, burn, in my front. If you are not able to burn it, give up your vanity as a consumer everywhere." (Fire) *tat upapreyāya*, went near that straw; *sarvajavena*, with the speed born of the fullest enthusiasm. Going there, *tat*, that thing; *na śaśāka dagdhum*, he could not burn, That Fire being unable to burn the straw and becoming ashamed and foiled in his promise, *tataḥ eva*, from that Yakṣa; silently *nivavṛte*, withdrew, and went back towards the gods (to tell them), "*Na aśakam*, I did not succeed; *vijñātum*, in knowing fully, *etat*, this Yakṣa: *yat etat Yakṣam*, as to what this Yakṣa is."

अथ वायुमबुवन्वायवेतद्विजानीहि किमेतद्यक्षमिति तथेति

॥ ७ ॥

7. Then (the gods) said to Air, "O Air, find out thoroughly about this thing as to what this Yakṣa is." (Air said), "So be it."

तदभ्यद्रवत्तमभ्यवदत्कोऽसीति वायुर्वा अहमस्मीत्यब्रवीन्मातरिश्वा वा अहमस्मीति ॥ ८ ॥

8. To It he went. To him It said, "Who are you?" He said, "I am known as Air, or I am Mātariśvā."

तस्मिंस्त्वयि किं वीर्यमित्यपीदं सर्वमाददीय यदिदं  
पृथिव्यामिति ॥ ९ ॥

9. (It said), "What power is there in you, such as you are?" (Air said), "I can blow away all this that is on the earth."

तस्मै तृणं निदधावेतदादत्स्वेति तदुपप्रेयाय सर्वजवेन  
तन्न शशाकादातु म तत एव निववृते नैतदशकं विज्ञातुं  
यदेतद्यक्षमिति ॥ १० ॥

10. (Yakṣa) placed a straw for him saying, "Take it up." Air approached the straw with all the strength born of enthusiasm. He could not take it up. He returned from that Yakṣa (to tell the gods), "I could not ascertain It fully as to what this Yakṣa is."

*Atha*, after that, they said to Air, "O Air, find out" etc. bears the same meaning as before. Vāyu (air) is so called because it blows, goes, or carries smell. Mātariśvā means that which travels (*śvayati*) in space (*mātari*). *Idam sarvam api*, all this. *ādadīya*, I can take up, blow away. *Yad idam prithivyām* etc., is just as explained earlier.

अथेन्द्रमब्रुवन्मघवन्नेतद्विजानीहि किमेतद्यक्षमिति तथेति  
तदभ्यद्रवत्तस्मात्तिरोदधे ॥ ११ ॥

11. Then (the gods) said to Indra, "O Maghavā, find out thoroughly about this thing,

as to what this Yakṣa is.” (He said), “So be it.” He (Indra) approached It (Yakṣa). From him (Yakṣa) vanished away.

*Atha indram abruvan, maghavan etat vijānīhi* etc., is to be explained as before. Indra who is a great Lord, and is called Maghavā, because of strength; *tat abhyadavat*, approached that Yakṣa. *Tasmāt*, from him, from Indra who had approached Itself (Yakṣa); that Brahman, *trodadhe*, vanished from sight. Brahman did not so much as grant him an interview, so that Indra’s pride at being Indra might be totally eradicated.

स तस्मिन्नेवाकाशे स्त्रियमाजगाम बहुशोभमानामुमाः  
हैमवतीं ताःहोवाच किमेतद्यक्षमिति ॥ १२ ॥

इति केनोपनिषिदि तृतीयः खण्डः ॥

12. In that very space he approached the superbly charming woman *viz* Umā Haimavatī.<sup>1</sup> To Her (he said), “What is this Yakṣa?”

The space, or the part of the space, where that Yakṣa vanished after revealing Itself, and the space where Indra also was at the time of the disappearance of Brahman, *tasmin eva ākāśe*, in that very space; *saḥ*, he, Indra, stayed on, deliberating in his mind, “What is this Yakṣa?” He did not return like Fire etc. Understanding his devotion to Yakṣa, Knowledge (of Brahman) made Her appearance as a woman, in the form Umā. *Saḥ*, he, Indra; *ājagāma*, approached; *bahusobhamānām*, superbly

<sup>1</sup> The superbly fascinating (*haimavatī*) knowledge of Brahman (*Umā*), or the daughter of Himalayas, whose name was Umā.

charming; *tām*, Her, Umā; Knowledge being the most fascinating of all fascinating things, the attribute 'superbly charming' is appropriate for it—he approached *haimavatīm*, one who was as though attired in dress of gold, i.e. exquisitely beautiful. Or Umā Herself is Haimavatī, the daughter of Himavat (Himalayas). Thinking that, since She is ever in association with the omniscient God, She must be able to know, Indra approached Her; (and) *tām*, to Her, to Umā; *uvāca*, said, "Tell me, *kim etat yakṣam iti*, what is this Yakṣa—that showed Itself and vanished?"

## PART IV

सा ब्रह्मेति होवाच ब्रह्मणो वा एतद्विजये महीयध्वमिति  
ततो हैव विदाञ्चकार ब्रह्मेति ॥ १ ॥

1. "It was Brahman," said She. "In Brahman's victory, indeed, you became elated thus." From that (utterance) alone, to be sure, did Indra learn that It was Brahman.

*Sā*, She; *uvāca ha*, said, "*Brahma iti*, It was Brahman; *Brahmaṇaḥ vai vijaye*, in the victory of God, indeed. The devils were conquered only by God, and you were mere instruments there. In the victory that was really His, you *mahīyadhvam*, became elated, you attained glory." The word *etat*, in this way, is used adverbially (to modify the verb). "But yours is this vaingloriousness: '*Asmākam eva ayam vijayah, asmākam eva ayam mahimā*—ours is this victory, ours is this glory,' (Ke. III. 2). *Tataḥ ha eva*, from that, from Umā's words alone, to be sure; Indra, *vidān-cakāra*, learned; *Brahma iti*, that It was Brahman. The emphatic limitation implied in *tataḥ ha eva*, from that alone to be sure, implies that (he came to learn) not independently.

तस्माद्वा एते देवा अतितरामिवान्यान्देवान्यदग्निर्वायु-  
रिन्द्रस्ते ह्येनन्नेदिष्ठं पस्पर्शस्ते ह्येनत्प्रथमो विदाञ्चकार  
ब्रह्मेति ॥ २ ॥

2. Therefore, indeed, these gods, viz Fire, Air, and Indra, did excel other gods, for they

touched It most proximately, and they knew It first as Brahman.

Since these gods—Fire, Air, and Indra—approached Brahman through conversation, visualisation, etc., *tasmāt*, therefore, *ete devāḥ*, these gods; *atitarām iva*, surpassed greatly, through their own excellence, i.e. good luck comprising power, quality, etc; *anyān devān*, the other gods. The word *iva* is meaningless or is used for the sake of emphasis. *Yat agniḥ vāyuḥ indraḥ*, (the gods) viz Fire, Air, and Indra. *Hi*, since; *te* they, those gods; *nediṣṭham pa-sparsuḥ*, most proximately, intimately, touched; *enat*, this Brahman; through the process of conversation etc., as described earlier. *Hi*, because, because of the further reason that; *te*, they; being *prathamah* (should be *prathamāḥ*) first, being prominent; *enat*, this Brahman; *vidāṁcakāra*, (should be *vidāṁcakruḥ*), knew, knew It to be Brahman.

तस्माद्वा इन्द्रोऽतितरामिवान्यान्देवान्स ह्येनन्नेदिष्टं  
पस्पर्श स ह्येनत्प्रथमो विदाञ्चकार ब्रह्मति ॥ ३ ॥

3. Therefore did Indra excel the other deities. For he touched It most proximately, inasmuch as he knew It first as Brahman.

Since even Fire and Air knew from the words of Indra alone, and since Indra heard first from Umā's words that It was Brahman, *tasmāt vai indraḥ atitarām iva*, therefore Indra did excel (the other deities). *Hi saḥ enat nedīṣṭham pa-sparsā*, inasmuch as he touched It most proximately, because *saḥ hi enat prathamah vidāṁcakāra Brahma iti*—this sentence has been already explained.

तस्यैष आदेशो यदेतद्विद्युतो व्यद्युतदा३ इतीन् न्यमी-  
मिषदा३ इत्यधिदैवतम् ॥ ४ ॥

4. This is Its instruction (about meditation) through analogy. It is like that which is (known as) the flash of lightning, and It is also as though the eye winked. These are (illustrations) in a divine context.<sup>1</sup>

*Tasya* of the Brahman under discussion, *eṣaḥ ādeśaḥ*, this is the instruction through analogy. That analogy through which the instruction about the incomparable Brahman is imparted is called *ādeśaḥ*. What is that? *Yat etat*, that fact, which is well known among people as the flash of lightning. Since *vidyutaḥ vyadyutat*, cannot mean that Brahman (*vyadyutat*) flashed (by borrowing Its light) (*vidyutaḥ*) from lightning,<sup>2</sup> therefore the meaning has to be assumed to be “the flash of lightning”. *Ā*, like, is used in the sense of comparison. The meaning is: “It is like the flash of lightning”; and (this meaning is acceptable) since it is seen in a different Vedic text, “comparable to a single flash of lightning” (Br. II. iii. 6); for Brahman disappeared after revealing Itself but once to the gods like lightning.

<sup>1</sup> Analogies with regard to Brahman as It exists in Its divine, but conditioned, form in the solar orb. Cf. *Gitā* VIII. 4 Brahman in Its form as *Hiraṇyagarbha* resides in the solar orb and presides over all the deities that are but Its different manifestations.

<sup>2</sup> “The meaning, ‘It flashed from lightning’, is inadmissible, for Brahman being self-effulgent, Its effulgence cannot be dependent on others. The meaning, ‘It performed the flashing of lightning,’ is unacceptable, since the flash that belongs to something cannot be produced by another.”—A.G.

Or the word *tejah* (brilliance) has to be supplied after the word *vidyutah* (of lightning). *Vyadyutat* (in this case) means flashed; (and) *ā* means as it were. The purport is: It was, as though, the brilliance of lightning flashed but once. The word *iti* is meant to call back to memory the word *ādeśa*; (so the meaning is): This is the *ādeśa*, the analogy. The word *it* is used for joining together. (So the sense is): Here is another analogy for It. What is that one? *Nyamīmiṣat*, winked, as the eye did the act of winking. The causative form (in *nyamīmiṣat*) is used in the same sense as the root itself. The *ā* is used here, too, in the sense of comparison. The meaning is: And it was like the opening and shutting of the eye with regard to its object. *Iti adhidaivatam*, this is by way of showing analogies of Brahman in a divine context.

अथाध्यात्मं यदेतद्गच्छतीव च मनोऽनेन चैतदुपस्मर-  
त्यभीक्षणं सङ्कल्पः ॥ ५ ॥

5. Then is the instruction through analogy in the context of the (individual) self: This known fact, that the mind seems to go to It (Brahman), and the fact that It (Brahman) is repeatedly remembered through the mind; as also the thought (that the mind has with regard to Brahman).

*Atha*, after this; is being told the analogical instruction *adhyātmam*, in the context of the soul, with regard to the indwelling Self. *Yat etat*, that which is a known fact, viz that *etat*, to this Brahman; *gacchati iva ca manah*, as though the mind goes, as though the mind enters into Brahman, encompasses It as an object. And the fact that *anena*, by

that mind; the spiritual aspirant; *abhīkṣṇam*, repeatedly, *upasmarati*, remembers intimately; *etat*, this Brahman; and the *sañkalpaḥ*, thought of the mind with regard to Brahman. Since Brahman has got the mind as Its limiting adjunct, It seems to be revealed by such states of the mind as thought, memory, etc., by which It seems to be objectified. Therefore, this is an instruction about Brahman, through analogy, in the context of the soul. In the divine context, Brahman has the attribute of revealing Itself quickly like lightning and winking;<sup>1</sup> and in the context of the soul, It has the attribute of manifesting Itself simultaneously with the states of the mind.<sup>2</sup> This is the instruction about Brahman through analogy. The need for this teaching about Brahman through analogy is that It becomes easily comprehensible to people of dull intellect when instruction is thus imparted. For the unconditioned Brahman, as such, cannot be comprehended by people of dull intellect.

तद्ध तद्वनं नाम तद्वनमित्युपासितव्यं स य एतदेवं वेदाभि  
हैनः सर्वाणि भूतानि संवाञ्छन्ति ॥ ६ ॥

<sup>1</sup> "The winking of the eye is rapid—this is well known; similar is Brahman's power of acting quickly. Its attribute in the divine context is the power to act quickly with regard to creation etc., since there is an absence of obstruction and effort. ... The light of lightning covers the whole world at once, similarly Brahman is unsurpassingly bright by nature, It accomplishes creation etc. of everything quickly, and It is possessed of supreme glory."—A.G.

<sup>2</sup> "One should meditate thus: 'Towards this Brahman, that is of the nature of light, my mind proceeds and there it rests.' The instruction in this form is the instruction in the context of the individual soul. The indwelling Brahman becomes revealed to one who meditates thus: 'The thoughts in my mind constantly revolve round Brahman.'"—A.G.

6. The Brahman is well known as the one adorable to all creatures: (hence) It is to be meditated on with the help of the name *tadvana*. All creatures surely pray to anyone who meditates on It in this way.

*Tat*, that Brahman; is *ha*, certainly; *tadvanam nāma*: *tadvanam* is derived from the words *tasya*, his, and *vanam*, adorable; It is adorable to all creatures, since It is their indwelling Self. Therefore Brahman is *tadvanam nāma*, well known as the one to be adored by all beings. Since it is *tadvana*, therefore *tadvanam iti*, through this name, *tadvana*, which is indicative of Its quality; It is *upāsītavyam*, to be meditated on. The text states the results of meditation through this name; *saḥ yah*, anyone that; *veda* meditates on; *etat*, the aforesaid Brahman; *evam*, thus, as possessed of the qualities mentioned above; *sarvāṇi bhūtāni*, all beings; *ha*, certainly; *enam*, to him, this meditator; *abhisamvāñchanti*, pray, as (they do) to Brahman.

उपनिषदं भो ब्रूहीत्युक्ता त उपनिषद्ब्राह्मीं वाव त  
उपनिषदमब्रूमेति ॥ ७ ॥

7. (Disciple): “Sir, speak of the secret knowledge.” (Teacher): “I have told you of the secret knowledge; I have imparted to you that very secret knowledge of Brahman.”

After being instructed thus, the disciple said to the teacher, “*Bhoḥ*, sir; *brūhi*, speak of; *upaniṣadam*, the secret thing, that is to be thought about.” *iti*. To the student who had spoken thus, the teacher said, *te*, to you; *upaniṣat*, the

secret knowledge; *uktā*, has been spoken of. “What is that, again?”—to such a question he answers, “*Te*, to you; *upa- niṣadam vāva abrūma iti*, I have spoken the very secret; *brāhmīm*, relating to Brahman, to the supreme Self—since the knowledge already imparted relates to the supreme Self.” For the sake of (distinguishing) what follows, the teacher delimits (his teaching) thus: “The Upaniṣad that I have told you consists of nothing but what has already been presented as the Upaniṣad of the supreme Self.”

*Objection:* What motive could have prompted the disciple, who had heard the Upaniṣad about the supreme Self to put this question: “Sir, speak of the Upaniṣad”? If, now, the question related to what had been already heard, then it is useless, inasmuch as it involved a repetition like the grinding over again of what had already been ground. If, again, the earlier Upaniṣad was incomplete, then it was not proper to conclude it by mentioning its result thus: “Having turned away from this world, the intelligent ones become immortal” (Kc. II. 5). Hence the question is improper even if it relates to some unexplained portion of the Upaniṣad already presented, inasmuch as no remainder was left over. What then is the intention of the question?

*Answer:* We say that this is the intention (of the disciple): “Does the secret teaching already imparted need any accessory, or does it not need any? If it does, tell me of the secret teaching with regard to that needed accessory. Or if it does not, then like Pippalāda make the clenching assertion: ‘There is nothing beyond this’ (Pr. VI. 7).” Thus this clencher of the teacher, “I have told you the Upaniṣad” is justified.

*Objection:* May it not be urged that this is not a concluding remark, inasmuch as the teacher has something more to add in the statement: "Concentration, cessation from sense-objects, rites, etc. are its legs" etc. (Ke. IV. 8).

*Answer:* It is true that a fresh matter is introduced by the teacher; but this is not done either by way of bringing in something as an attributive constituent (*śeṣa*) of the Upaniṣad or as an accessory (*sahakāri*) to it,<sup>1</sup> but rather as a means for the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahman, because *tapas* (concentration) etc., occurring as they do in the same passage along with the Vedas and their supplementaries, are given an equal status with the latter, and because neither the Vedas nor the science of pronunciation and euphony (*śikṣā*) etc., which are their supplementaries, can directly by either attributive constituents of the knowledge of Brahman or its helpful accessories.

*Objection:* Should not even things that occur in the same passage be put to separate uses according to their appropriateness? Just as the *mantras*, occurring at the end of a sacrifice, in the form of a hymn meant for the invocation of (many) deities, are applied with respect to the (individual) deities concerned, similarly it can be imagined that concentration, self-control, rites, truth, etc., will either be attributive constituents of the knowledge of Brahman or be helpful accessories (in accordance with their respective

<sup>1</sup> "By the word *śeṣa* is implied an attributive part contributing to the production of the effect (of the main rite). By the word *sahakāri* is implied something that need not necessarily be a constituent, but can be combined (with the principal rite)." —A.G. Both have a bearing on the result.

appropriateness).<sup>1</sup> As for the Vedas and their subsidiaries, they are means for either knowledge or rites by virtue of their respective meanings (ideas). In this way this division becomes appropriate when significance of words, relation (of things denoted), and reason are taken into consideration. Suppose we advance such an argument?

*Answer:* No, because this is illogical. This division does not certainly accord with facts, because it is not reasonable that the knowledge of Brahman, which repels all ideas of distinction of deeds, doers, and results, should have dependence on any attributive constituent, or any relation with any helpful accessory, and because the knowledge of Brahman and its result, freedom, are concerned only with the Self which is unassociated with any object. "He who wants emancipation should for ever give up all works together with their instruments, because it is known only by the man of renunciation. The state of the supreme Reality that is the same as the indwelling Self is attained by the man of renunciation." Therefore knowledge cannot reasonably have work either as an accessory or as a complement. Therefore the division (of concentration etc.) on the analogy of the invocation through hymn, occurring at the

<sup>1</sup> "At the end of all sacrifices, the deities are invoked with the hymn beginning with:

अग्निरिदं हविरजुषतावीवृधत महो ज्यायोऽकृत ।

अग्नीषोमाविदं हविरजुषेतामवीवृधेतां मही ज्यायोऽक्राताम् ॥

Now, although in this hymn many deities are mentioned, still, since it is proper to invoke at the end the deity to whom any particular sacrifice is made, the hymn itself has to be applied in accord with that propriety. Similarly concentration etc., will themselves be used as attributive constituents of knowledge."—A.G.

end of a sacrifice, is quite inappropriate. Hence it is proper to say that the question and the answer are meant for fixing a limit thus: "The secret teaching that has been imparted extends thus far only; it is adequate for the attainment of knowledge without depending on anything else."

तस्यै तपो दमः कर्मेति प्रतिष्ठा वेदाः सर्वाङ्गानि सत्य-  
मायतनम् ॥ ८ ॥

8. Concentration, cessation from sense-objects, rites, etc., are its legs; the Vedas are all its limbs: truth is its abode.

Concentration etc. are the means for the acquisition; *tasyai*, (should be *tasyāḥ*) of that secret teaching (Upaniṣad), regarding Brahman which I thus spoke before you. *Tapaḥ*, the concentration of the body, the senses, and the mind; *damaḥ*, cessation (from sense-objects); *karma*, rites, Agnihotra etc. (are the means); for it is found that the knowledge of Brahman arises in a man who has attained the requisite holiness through the purification of the heart. For it is a matter of experience that, even though Brahman is spoken of, there is either non-comprehension or mis-comprehension in the case of one who has not been purged of his sin, as for instance, in the case of Indra and Virocana (Ch. VIII. vii-xii). Therefore knowledge, as imparted by the Vedas, dawns on one whose mind has been purified by concentration etc., either in this life or in many past ones, as is mentioned by the Vedic verse: "These things get revealed when spoken to that high-souled man who has supreme devotion towards the Effulgent One, and the same devotion to his teacher as to the Effulgent One" (Śv. VI.

23). And this is borne out by the Smṛti, "Knowledge dawns on a man on the eradication of sinful acts" (Mbh. Śā. 204.8). The word *iti* is used to draw attention to a synecdoche; that is to say, by the word *iti* are suggested other factors, beginning with these, which are helpful to the rise of knowledge, such as "Humility, unpretentiousness," etc. (G. xiii. 7). (Concentration etc. are the) *pratiṣṭhā*, two legs, stands as it were, of that Upaniṣad; for when these exist, knowledge of Brahman stands firm and becomes active, just as a man does with his legs. *Vedāḥ*, the four Vedas; and *sarvāṅgāni*, all the six subsidiaries beginning with the science of pronunciation and euphony (*śikṣā*) (are also the legs). The Vedas are the legs because they reveal the rites and knowledge; and all the *angāni*, subsidiaries, are so because they are meant for the protection of the Vedas. Or since the word *pratiṣṭhā* has been imagined to imply the two legs (of the knowledge), the Vedas are its *sarvāṅgāni*, all the limbs beginning with the head. In this case, the subsidiaries, such as the science of pronunciation and euphony, are to be understood to have been mentioned by the word Vedas; because when the principal factor is mentioned, the subsidiaries are mentioned *ipso facto*, they being dependent on the principal. *Satyam āyatanam*, *satya* is the *āyatana*, the dwelling place where the secret teaching resides. *Satya* means freedom from deceit and crookedness in speech, mind, and body; for knowledge abides in those who are free from deceit and who are holy, and not in those who are devilish by nature and are deceitful, as the Vedic text says, "those in whom there are no insincerity, falsehood, and deceit" (Pr. I. 16). Therefore *Satya* (truth) is imagined as the abode. Although by implication, truth has already been mentioned as legs, along with concentration etc., still

its allusion again as the abode is for indicating that as a means (for the acquisition of knowledge) it excels others, as the Smṛti says. "A thousand horse sacrifices and truth are weighed in a balance: and one truth outweighs a thousand horse sacrifices" (Viṣṇu Smṛti, 8).

यो वा एतामेवं वेदापहत्य पाप्मानमनन्ते स्वर्गे लोके  
ज्येये प्रतितिष्ठति प्रतितिष्ठति ॥ ९ ॥

इति केनोपनिषदि चतुर्थः खण्डः ॥

9. Anyone who knows this thus, he, having dispelled sin, remains firmly seated in the boundless, blissful, and highest Brahman. He remains firmly seated (there).

*Yuh vai*, anyone who; *veda evam*, realises thus—as spoken; *etām*, this thing, this blessed knowledge of Brahman which has been already spoken of in the text beginning with "Willed by whom" (Ke. I. 1), which has been eulogised in the text beginning with, "It was Brahman indeed" (Ke. III. 1), and which is "the foundation of all knowledge" (Mu. I. i. 1). Notwithstanding the presentation of the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman in "because thereby one gets immortality" (Ke. II. 4), it is mentioned at the end by way of a formal conclusion. (Such a knower) *apahatya pāpmānam*, dispelling sin, shaking off the seed of mundane existence constituted by ignorance, desire, and work; *pratitiṣṭhati*, remains firmly seated *anante*, in boundless, *svarge loke*: *Svarge loke* means in Brahman who is all Bliss. Being qualified by the word *ananta*, boundless, the word *svarga* does not mean heaven. Lest the word boundless

(*ananta*) be taken in any secondary sense, the text says  *jyeye*, in the higher, that which is greater than all, in one's own Self which is boundless in the primary sense. The purport is that he does not again return to this world.

ॐ आप्यायन्तु ममाङ्गानि वाक्प्राणश्चक्षुः श्रोत्रमथो  
बलमिन्द्रियाणि च सर्वाणि । सर्वं ब्रह्मौपनिषदं माऽहं ब्रह्म  
निराकुर्यां मा मा ब्रह्म निराकरोदनिराकरणमस्त्वनिराकरणं  
मेऽस्तु । तदात्मनि निरते य उपनिषत्सु धर्मास्ते मयि  
सन्तु ते मयि सन्तु ॥

ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ॥